In this issue:
1. Firm and Industry News
2. Statutory Accident Benefits Priority Disputes
3. Ontario Court Jurisdiction
4. Cape Town Treaty and Aircraft Protocol
1. Firm and Industry News
- Fernandes Hearn LLP Annual
Seminar - Toronto - January 17th 2013
- Marine Club Annual Dinner - Toronto - January
Gordon Hearn will be representing the Firm
at the Conference of Freight Counsel meeting in Dallas, Texas on
January 13-14th and at the Transportation Lawyers Association annual
Chicago Conference on January 25th. Kim Stoll will also be attending
the Transportation Lawyers Association annual Chicago Conference
on January 25th.
Gordon Hearn will be presenting a paper "Contracting
Motor Carrier Services in Canada: Key Elements and the Regulatory
Framework" at a meeting of the National Motor Freight Traffic
Association in San Diego, California on January 29th.
Rui Fernandes will be presenting a webinar
for the Ontario Trucking Association on freight claims on January
29th, 2013. He will also be presenting a paper on "New Developments
in Canadian Subrogation Law" at the Recovery Forum in New
York on April 11th, 2013.
LexisNexis Canada has just released its Halsbury's
Laws of Canada - Maritime Law title. Rui Fernandes is
the author of this new work. This completes Rui's trilogy of works
for LexisNexis' Halsbury's Laws of Canada. Last December his Transportation
- Carriage of Goods and Transportation - Railway Law was published.
The current work is described by LexisNexis with the following introduction:
"The globalization of the economy has ballooned
the international shipping community in size, making the sea an
integral means of modern trade. This title is a complete source
of admiralty law across Canada. Covering both the general issues
of maritime law, such as its legislative and constitutional framework,
and the more specific issues, such as regulatory and safety requirements
and the operation of ships, this title is essential for practitioners
working in fields of trade, administrative and international law."
Accident Benefits Priority Disputes
The Ontario Insurance Act provides that every
contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy shall provide
for statutory accident benefits. It also provides that certain rules
apply for determining who is liable to pay statutory accident benefits.
Any person who is injured in a motor vehicle collision or certain
relatives or dependents of any person who is injured in a motor
vehicle collision may be eligible for benefits. Ontario's standard
auto insurance policy provides individuals with benefits, such as
medical and rehabilitation benefits, caregiver benefits, income
replacement and non-earner benefits, who are injured in a motor
vehicle collision regardless of who is at fault. The relevant sections
of the legislation are:
Statutory accident benefits
268. (1) Every contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability
policy, including every such contract in force when the Statutory
Accident Benefits Schedule is made or amended, shall be deemed
to provide for the statutory accident benefits set out in the Schedule and any amendments to the Schedule, subject
to the terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits set
out in that Schedule. 1993, c. 10, s. 26 (1).
Liability to pay
(2) The following rules apply for determining who is liable to
pay statutory accident benefits:
1. In respect of an occupant of an automobile,
i. the occupant has recourse against the insurer of an automobile
in respect of which the occupant is an insured,
ii. if recovery is unavailable under subparagraph i, the occupant
has recourse against the insurer of the automobile in which he
or she was an occupant,
iii. if recovery is unavailable under subparagraph i or ii, the
occupant has recourse against the insurer of any other automobile
involved in the incident from which the entitlement to statutory
accident benefits arose,
iv. if recovery is unavailable under subparagraph i, ii or iii,
the occupant has recourse against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims
2. In respect of non-occupants,
i. the non-occupant has recourse against the insurer of an automobile
in respect of which the non-occupant is an insured,
ii. if recovery is unavailable under subparagraph i, the non-occupant
has recourse against the insurer of the automobile that struck
iii. if recovery is unavailable under subparagraph i or ii, the
non-occupant has recourse against the insurer of any automobile
involved in the incident from which the entitlement to statutory
accident benefits arose,
iv. if recovery is unavailable under subparagraph i, ii or iii,
the non-occupant has recourse against the Motor Vehicle Accident
One area that gives rise to litigation involves determining
which of several insurers pays for the statutory benefits - priority
Recently in Security National Insurance Company
v. Markel Insurance Company, 2012 ONCA 683 the Ontario Court
of Appeal had occasion to determine two priority disputes between
insurers arising from the interpretation of s. 66(1) of the Statutory
Accident Benefits Schedule - Accidents on or after November 1, 1996,
O. Reg. 403/96 ("SABS"), enacted pursuant to the Insurance
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8.
Section 66(1) deems certain persons to be named insureds
for the purposes of s. 268(2) of the Insurance Act. This
affects the priority in which insurers are to pay statutory accident
benefits under s. 268 of the Act.
Section 66 is headed "Company Automobiles and
Rental Automobiles". Section 66(1) states:
(1) An individual who is living and ordinarily
present in Ontario shall be deemed for the purpose of this
Regulation to be the named insured under the policy insuring
an automobile at the time of an accident if, at the time of the
(a) the insured automobile is being made
available for the individual's regular use by a corporation, unincorporated
association, partnership, sole proprietorship or other entity; [Emphasis added.]
In cases with comparable facts, two arbitrators interpreted
s. 66(1) differently and therefore reached different legal conclusions.
The matter ended up in the Court of Appeal.
Case No. 1 - Security National Insurance Company
v. Markel Insurance Company
Pinnacle Transport Ltd. operated a transport company.
Markel Insurance Company issued a motor vehicle liability policy
to Pinnacle as named insured, which provided coverage for all vehicles
owned, registered, leased and/or operated on behalf of the named
Duncan McKerchar carried on business as a sole proprietorship
with the business name "The Tidy Scot". Mr. McKerchar
bought a 1998 GMC truck from Pinnacle and paid for it in bi-weekly
Pinnacle and The Tidy Scot entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement, dated September 14, 2005. It provided that:
(i) The Tidy Scot, as an independent contractor,
would perform such transportation and ancillary services, including
loading and unloading as requested by Pinnacle. The Agreement
expressly provided that the relationship was not one of master/servant,
principal/agent or employer/employee.
(ii) Pinnacle agreed to use the truck that
was owned or leased by The Tidy Scot, but The Tidy Scot agreed
to update the truck when and if required by Pinnacle and/or the
Insurance Company. (The Insurance Company was not identified in
(iii) During the term of the Agreement, The
Tidy Scot would have full control and possession of the truck
and assumed total responsibility for the operation, supervision
and maintenance of the truck in a safe and proper working condition
and in appearance satisfactory to Pinnacle. The Tidy Scot agreed
to pay and to indemnify Pinnacle for all expenses arising out
of the operation, maintenance and repair of the truck.
(iv) If required by Pinnacle, The Tidy Scot
was to affix Pinnacle's logo/identification to the truck.
(v) The Tidy Scot agreed to enroll in Pinnacle's
fleet public liability and property damage and cargo insurance
coverage. The Tidy Scot was responsible for the deductibles and
was to pay $145 per pay period for the insurance coverage.
(vi) Pinnacle would buy the license plate
for the truck but The Tidy Scot would pay for it.
(vii) The Tidy Scot was not to use the truck
as a personal vehicle and was not to operate the truck for any
other carrier or operator while it was being operated under Pinnacle's
license and insurance.
(viii) The Tidy Scot received 75 per cent
of the revenues generated by the truck each pay period and Pinnacle
received 25 per cent.
The vehicle registration showed Duncan R. B. McKerchar
/ The Tidy Scot as the owner of the vehicle but Pinnacle was listed
as the owner on the plate portion of the registration.
Consistent with the terms of the Agreement, the truck
was never used by The Tidy Scot for anybody other than Pinnacle.
On April 4, 2006, Mr. McKerchar was injured. He attempted
to jump onto his moving truck, which was being operated by another
driver, fell under it and was run over. Mr. McKerchar was not a
named insured nor a listed driver on the Markel policy of insurance
issued to Pinnacle. He claimed statutory accident benefits from
Security National Insurance Company ("Security National"),
the insurer of his personal use vehicle. Security National paid
the statutory accident benefits but instituted a claim that the
obligation to pay these benefits rested with Markel as the insurer
of Pinnacle's fleet of vehicles.
At arbitration, the Arbitrator also concluded that
Mr. McKerchar was an occupant of the truck at the time of the accident.
The Arbitrator held that it would strain the wording of s. 66 to
say that the truck was made available by Mr. McKerchar/The Tidy
Scot to Mr. McKerchar. Nor could the Arbitrator see any evidence
of a joint venture between Mr. McKerchar and Pinnacle or "other
entity" for the purpose of s. 66(1). Therefore Mr. McKerchar
was not a deemed named insured under the Markel policy. In the result,
Security National was required to pay the statutory accident benefits.
The Court of Appeal found that the Arbitrator was
wrong. The Court espoused that:
I see no legitimate reason why a sole proprietorship
should not be permitted to make a vehicle available to the sole
proprietor. The subsection contemplates that an individual operating
a sole proprietorship can make a vehicle available to him or herself.
Put differently, there is no requirement that the two parties
be divorced from one another. In my view, on a plain reading of
s. 66(1)(a), this is clear.
This brings me to a discussion of the legislative
intent. I agree with Arbitrator Bialkowski that the intent of
the section is that the commercial insurer should be responsible
for the accident benefits arising from the operation of the commercial
The substance of the subsection is consistent
with that conclusion. The section is headed "Company Automobiles
and Rental Automobiles". While not determinative, the heading
does provide some context. As with a company or rental automobile,
if a vehicle is made available for regular use by any of the listed
entities, the risk is to be borne by the insurer of that vehicle.
This, in my view, makes sense and should be so in spite of any
past practice in the insurance industry.
I therefore conclude that both the language
and the evident intent of s. 66(1) permits an insured vehicle
to be made available for an individual's regular use by the individual's
Markel was found liable for the statutory benefits.
Case No. 2 - Kingsway General Insurance Company
v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company
Trowbridge Transport Ltd. operated a transport company.
Kingsway General Insurance Company issued a fleet policy in favour
of Trowbridge as named insured, which provided coverage for all
vehicles owned and operated on behalf of the named insured.
William Higgs owned a freightliner tractor. He worked
as a self-employed owner/operator for Trowbridge. He had worked
in this capacity since 2002 when he entered into the first of a
series of owner/operator agreements between his sole proprietorship,
"Bill Higgs & Sons", and Trowbridge. In August 2007,
Mr. Higgs' registration of his business name expired.
Trowbridge entered into an Owner/Operator Agreement
with Bill Higgs & Sons, dated January 1, 2008 (the "Agreement").
It provided that:
(i) Bill Higgs & Sons, as an independent
contractor, was to lease its freightliner tractor to Trowbridge
and perform haulage services for Trowbridge. The Agreement expressly
provided that the relationship created was that of an independent
contractor and was not an employment relationship.
(ii) Bill Higgs & Sons was obliged to
equip its freightliner tractor in accordance with Trowbridge's
standards. It was responsible for maintenance of the vehicle and
Trowbridge was responsible for maintenance of any trailers.
(iii) Trowbridge would obtain and maintain
in force policies of insurance. The policies would be purchased
on behalf of Bill Higgs & Sons, which was responsible for
payment of all deductibles.
(iv) Trowbridge would pay for the licence
plate on behalf of Bill Higgs & Sons.
(v) Restrictions were placed on the use of
alternate drivers and passengers were not permitted without Trowbridge's
Consistent with the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Higgs'/Bill
Higgs & Sons' freightliner tractor was plated in the name of
Trowbridge and Trowbridge obtained vehicle insurance from Kingsway
General. The freightliner tractor was a scheduled vehicle on the
Kingsway General policy and Mr. Higgs was a listed driver but not
a named insured on the policy.
In February 2008, Mr. Higgs was injured in an accident
while he was driving the freightliner tractor. At the time of the
accident, Mr. Higgs was the named insured under the automobile insurance
policy issued by Gore Mutual Insurance Company for his 1996 Oldsmobile
personal use automobile. After the accident, Mr. Higgs applied to
Kingsway General for statutory accident benefits. Kingsway General
paid the accident benefits but served Gore Mutual with a notice
of dispute between insurers. Kingsway General took the position
that Gore Mutual should be the insurer liable to pay the accident
benefits. Gore Mutual disagreed.
The two insurance companies proceeded with an arbitration.
The Arbitrator held that Mr. Higgs was a "deemed named insured"
under s. 66(1) of the SABS because the freightliner tractor was
made available to Mr. Higgs by: (a) the sole proprietorship of Bill
Higgs & Sons, or (b) another entity, namely, the joint venture
comprised of Bill Higgs & Sons and Trowbridge under the Agreement.
The Arbitrator concluded that the legislative intent of s. 66(1)
was to place the freightliner tractor insurer in priority to the
individual's personal use vehicle insurer in circumstances in which
the accident involved the freightliner tractor in the course of
the commercial arrangement between the parties. As such, he determined
that Kingsway General, as the insurer of the freightliner tractor,
was the priority insurer responsible to pay all accident benefits
to Mr. Higgs.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Arbitrator
on the same analysis as case no. 1 above. Kingsway General was responsible
to pay all of the accident benefits.
3. Ontario Court Jurisdiction: Does a Connection
through a Web Site Constitute "Doing Business in Ontario"?
Our courts do not allow any lawsuit to be conducted
in the Ontario courts simply because a plaintiff chooses to sue
here. There has to be a "real and substantial connection"
between the case and the Ontario jurisdiction. As determined by
a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, (*1) a court will
have jurisdiction in respect of a claim on the basis of one or more
"objective factors" being satisfied that connect the legal
situation or the subject matter of the litigation with the Ontario
The "objective factors" identified by the
Supreme Court of Canada to be taken into consideration are as follows:
a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;
b) the defendant carries on business in the province;
c) the tort was committed in the province; and/or
d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.
These factors - in particular items a) and d) - were
recently put to the test in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
decision of Colavecchia v. The Berkeley Hotel (*3). This
decision provides an interesting analysis on the extent of how one's
accessibility through the Internet may constitute "doing business"
in a jurisdiction.
In February of 2011, the plaintiffs decided to book
a short holiday in the United Kingdom. The plaintiff Christene DeGasperis
used her TD Visa card to make a reservation online at the Berkeley
Hotel in London. After checking in to the hotel, the plaintiff Sandro
Colavecchia was injured when he slipped and fell in the bathroom
of their hotel room. Ms. DeGasperis called for a taxi and transported
Mr. Colavecchia to a hospital where he was treated for his injuries.
The plaintiffs returned to Ontario the next day. The plaintiffs
sued the Hotel in Ontario claiming damages for lost income and for
lost enjoyment of life on account of the injuries. The Hotel responded
to the lawsuit with a motion to dismiss the claim on the basis that
there was a lack of jurisdiction in the Ontario Superior Court.
As to the "objective factors" listed above,
governing whether the Ontario court had jurisdiction over the claim,
the plaintiffs were not suggesting that the Hotel was domiciled
in Ontario, or for that matter that the tort was committed in Ontario.
The plaintiffs did assert that the Hotel carried on business in
Ontario, and further that that the Hotel reservation contract was
made in Ontario.
On the Motion for a "Stay" by the Hotel
Prior to addressing the "objective factors"
question, the Court addressed a further consideration offered by
the plaintiffs that the law suit had a proper "home" in
Ontario by virtue of the fact that the plaintiffs suffered "damages"
in Ontario, which should be considered a "connecting factor"
such that the claim could be brought here. Prior to the Supreme
Court of Canada's recent pronouncement of the "objective factors",
the fact that damages were sustained in Ontario had historically
suggested at least some connection with the province. The
Court did not apply the older body of "location of damages
suffered" case law in favour of the plaintiffs so as to find
that Ontario court had jurisdiction over the claim. This older body
of case law was found to be dated, that "connecting factor"
having been laid to rest by the Supreme Court of Canada:
The use of damage sustained as a connecting factor
may raise difficult issues. For torts like defamation, sustaining
damages completes the commission of the tort and often tends to
locate the tort in the jurisdiction where the damage is sustained.
In other cases, the situation is less clear. The problem with
accepting unreservedly that if damage is sustained at a particular
place, the claim presumptively falls within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the place, is that this risks sweeping into that
jurisdiction claims that only have a limited relationship with
that forum. An injury may happen in one place, but the pain and
inconvenience resulting from it might be felt in another country
and later in a third one. As a result, presumptive effect cannot
be accorded to this connecting factor. (*4)
The judge hearing the Hotel's application accordingly
proceeded to deal with the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs
that two of the foregoing "objective factors" were, in
Issue #1: Does the Hotel Carry on Business in Ontario?
Ms. DeGasperis booked the hotel through the TD Visa
Travel Rewards website. She logged on, conducted a search for a
hotel in London, and, based on the results, selected a hotel. She
paid for the hotel by redeeming travel points. The plaintiffs argued
that the Hotel carried on business in Ontario by virtue of its connection
with the TD Travel Rewards website. The Court, however, noted that
the Hotel did not have any office or other premises in Ontario.
There was no evidence that Hotel employees regularly visited Ontario
or that the Hotel engaged in a marketing campaign to specifically
target Ontario residents.
In the Van Breda decision, being the Supreme
Court of Canada decision referred to above, the plaintiff was injured
while on holiday in Cuba at a resort managed by Club Resorts. The
plaintiff's husband -a professional squash player - had an arrangement
with the club where he would provide two hours of tennis lessons
per day in exchange for room and board for the plaintiff and him
at the hotel. The arrangement had been made via another individual
who was also a defendant in that lawsuit and who specialized in
recruiting professionals for that club and other similar clubs.
There was also a companion law suit to the Van Breda claim,
involving different facts, and also concerning a claim by a plaintiff
who had drowned while scuba diving at one of the club's properties.
The Court found in both cases that Club Resorts was
carrying on business in Ontario. In the case of Ms. Van Breda's
husband, while in Ontario he entered into a special contract specifically
aimed at recruiting racquet professionals. As concerns the companion
action, the court found that Club Resorts had specifically marketed
to Ontario residents. Club Resorts also had the use of an office
in Ontario and its employees frequently travelled to Ontario for
business purposes. Club Resorts was found to have been in the business
of marketing and organizing tours from "wintery Ontario to
its properties in the sunny Caribbean".
In this case, the Hotel defendant did not have an
office or employees in Ontario. There was no evidence that it specifically
marketed to Ontario residents. The Hotel was one of many hotels
that were listed on the TD Visa Travel Rewards website. To quote
the judge, the TD Visa Travel Rewards website "seems nothing
more than a search engine for those who want to use their travel
points - on any hotel that has a relationship with TD Visa Travel
Rewards". The Court suggested that, at most, TD Visa Travel
Rewards is a mere booking agent of the Hotel. This was not enough
to create a principal - agent relationship that the plaintiffs were
suggesting in terms of fixing the Hotel as having a business presence
in Ontario through the "agency" of TD Visa Travel Rewards.
Rather, the Court found that it is was obvious that such a boutique
hotel in a foreign jurisdiction would make it possible for potential
patrons to book through websites like TD Visa Travel Rewards specifically
so that the hotel does not have to carry on business in a foreign
jurisdiction. As the Court put it, "since the Web is everywhere,
on the plaintiff's theory, every hotel in the world that can be
booked through the Web does business everywhere. If the interaction
between Ms. DeGasperis and the hotel through a Canadian booking
website was enough to be "carrying on business", it would
amount to a form of universal jurisdiction".
The Court cited the Supreme Court of Canada in Van
Breda on this point:
The notion of carrying on business requires
some form of actual, not only virtual, presence in the jurisdiction,
such as maintaining an office there or regularly visiting the
territory of the particular jurisdiction. " (*5)
In essence, the mere access to a website is not enough
to establish that a defendant carries on business in any particular
territory or region. (*6) Accordingly the Court refused to find
that the Ontario courts had jurisdiction over the claim on this
Issue #2: Was a Contract Connected with the Dispute
Made in Ontario?
The Court noted that the above "carrying on business"
issue is closely connected to the alternative argument raised by
the plaintiffs that the subject contract had been entered into in
Ontario. The argument was raised that, by logging onto the TD Travel
Rewards website, the plaintiff Ms. DeGasperis had made a contract
with the Hotel in Ontario. The court disagreed, finding that, at
most, the plaintiffs had made a contract with TD for TD to, in turn,
make a booking with the Hotel.
Citing basic contract law, the Court noted that, for
there to be a valid contract, there must be the essential elements
of offer, acceptance and consideration. These elements all indicated
a contractual relationship between TD Visa Travel Rewards and the
plaintiffs - there being nothing along these lines between the Hotel
and the plaintiffs. There was simply no connection between the plaintiffs
and the Hotel until the plaintiffs checked in. On the question of
'consideration' - that is, the requirement for some corresponding
obligation from the plaintiffs to use the hotel room in exchange
for the use of same, the plaintiffs paid with their TD Travel Rewards
points - which could not be redeemed directly with the Hotel. The
Court found that, if there was a contract with the Hotel, this was
formed when the plaintiffs actually checked into the Hotel and that
any legal aspects of their stay would then be governed by the U.K.
law governing innkeepers. The Court accordingly found that there
was no contract connected with the dispute that was made in Ontario.
In the result, the action was stayed in favour of
the Hotel and the plaintiffs were required to pursue a claim for
the damages sought in the United Kingdom.
*1 Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda  S.C.J. No. 17, at para. 82
*2 at para. 90
*3 2012 ONSC 4747
*4 at para. 89
*5 at para. 87
*6 It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada in the Van
Breda decision noted that the issue had not been placed before
it to decide whether, and if so, when e-trade in the jurisdiction
would amount to a presence in the jurisdiction. This is a
question that has accordingly been left for another day.
4. Cape Town Treaty and Aircraft Protocol
On December 28th 2012 the Honourable Denis Lebel,
Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities and Minister
of the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the regions of
Quebec, announced action to strengthen the airline industry through
the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
and the Aircraft Protocol.
The Cape Town Convention on International Interests
in Mobile Equipment, or Cape Town Treaty is an international treaty
intended to standardize transactions involving movable property.
The treaty creates international standards for registration of ownership
(including dedicated registration agencies), security interests
(liens), leases and conditional sales contracts, and various legal
remedies for default in financing agreements, including repossession
and the effect of particular states' bankruptcy laws.
Three protocols to the convention are specific to
three types of movable equipment: Aircraft Equipment (aircraft and
aircraft engines; signed in 2001), railway equipment (signed in
2007) and space assets (signed in 2012).
The treaty resulted from a diplomatic conference held
in Cape Town, South Africa in 2001. The Convention portion of the
treaty came into force on April 1, 2004. The Aircraft Protocol (which
applies specifically to aircraft and aircraft engines) took effect
on March 1, 2006 when it was ratified by 8 countries.
The Aircraft Protocol (officially: Protocol to
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
matters specific to aircraft equipment) was signed immediately
with the treaty and the only protocol currently entered into force.
It applies to aircraft that can carry at least eight people or 2750
kilograms of cargo, aircraft engines with thrust exceeding 1,750
pounds-force (7,800 N) or 550 horsepower (410 kW), and helicopters
carrying 5 or more passengers.
In introducing the ratification by Canada, the Federal
Government stated that these agreements could help Canadian airlines
achieve important savings on aircraft financing.
"The Government of Canada is focused on the economy
and working to create a more competitive business environment in
Canada," said Lebel. "The Convention and Protocol help
to strengthen the airline and aerospace industries through an international
legal framework for the financing of their aircraft equipment."
The Jobs and Growth Act, 2012, which was passed by
Parliament earlier in December 2012, includes amendments to the
International Interests in Mobile Equipment (aircraft equipment)
Act and other legislation that introduces necessary policy and regulatory
changes to support Canada's participation in the Convention and
This Federal legislation, in conjunction with legislation
adopted in Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador,
Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan,
implements the Convention and Protocol.
The Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol will
take effect in Canadaon April 1, 2013.
Participation in the Convention and Protocol was confirmed
with the deposit of Canada's instrument of ratification with the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit)
in Rome on Friday, Dec. 21, 2012.
The International Registry of Mobile Assets established
to record international property interests in the aircraft equipment
covered by the treaty is located in Ireland. Mediation cases for
leasing disputes are to be heard in the High Court of Ireland.
This newsletter is published to keep our clients and friends informed
of new and important legal developments. It is intended for information
purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should not
act or fail to act on anything based on any of the material contained
herein without first consulting with a lawyer. The reading, sending
or receiving of information from or via the newsletter does not
create a lawyer-client relationship. Unless otherwise noted, all
content on this newsletter (the "Content") including images,
illustrations, designs, icons, photographs, and written and other
materials are copyrights, trade-marks and/or other intellectual
properties owned, controlled or licensed by Fernandes Hearn LLP.
The Content may not be otherwise used, reproduced, broadcast, published,or
retransmitted without the prior written permission of Fernandes